Global Games in Ames 2016: An Economic Theory Conference at Iowa State University Friday-Saturday, April 8-9, 2016 368A Heady Hall
What Are Global Games? Global games are a relatively new approach to using economic theory to make predictions in collective action problems. In a collective action problem, a set of agents choose whether or not to take an action, where an agent’s benefit from taking the action is higher if other agents also do so. Examples include joint ventures, computer platforms, bank runs, business cycles, and riots.
Friday, April 8 (Heady Hall rm. 368A) 1-2 pm: Conference registration and refreshments 2-3: Alessandro Pavan (Northwestern), “Platform Pricing under Dispersed Information” (with Bruno Jullien). Discussant: David Frankel 3-4: Guido Lorenzoni (Northwestern), “Slow-Moving Debt Crises” (with Iván Werning). Discussant: Thomas Eisenbach 4-4:30: Coffee break 4:30-5:30: George-Marios Angeletos (MIT), title TBA. Discussant: Guido Lorenzoni 5:30-6:30: Muhamet Yildiz (MIT), “Crises: Equilibrium Shifts under Model Uncertainty” (with Stephen Morris). Discussant: Ming Yang
Saturday, April 9 (Heady Hall rm. 368A) 8-8:30 am: Refreshments 8:30-9:30: Edouard Challe (Ecole Polytechnique and CREST), “Market Microstructure, Information Aggregation and Equilibrium Uniqueness in a Global Game” (with Edouard Chrétien). Discussant: George-Marios Angeletos 9:30-10:30: David Frankel (ISU), “Optimal Insurance for Users of Network Goods.” Discussant: Alessandro Pavan 10:30-11: Coffee and sandwich break 11-12: Ming Yang (Duke), “Coordination and the Relative Cost of Distinguishing Nearby States” (with Stephen Morris). Discussant: Muhamet Yildiz 12-1: Thomas Eisenbach (FRB-NY), “Rollover Risk as Market Discipline: A Two-Sided Inefficiency.” Discussant: Edouard Challe
Registration For more detailed information or to register, email: email@example.com with your name and contact information by March 23, 2016.